

Message Text

PAGE 01 SEOUL 04472 201118Z

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SUBJECT: GENERAL WEYAND'S CALL ON PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE

1. GENERAL WEYAND CALLED ON PRESIDENT PARK JUNE 19 ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR SNEIDER AND UNC COMMANDER STILWELL. PRESENT ON THE KOREAN SIDE WERE MND MINISTER SUH, SECRETARY GENERAL KIM, GENERAL LEE SAE HO AND MR. CHOI KWANG SOO.

2. FOLLOWING PRESENTATION OF AN AWARD TO GENERAL WEYNAD THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF UNC FORCES. PARK CONCURRED WITH GENERAL WEYAND'S ESTIMATE OF THE THE READINESS OF BOTH THE ROK AND US FORCES, NOTING THAT THEY WERE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CINCUNC. HE SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT MUCH ATTENTION WAS NOW FOCUSED ON THE SITUATION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA. AS HE HAD BEEN TELLING US NEWSMEN, WHETHER OR NOT THERE WOULD BE CONFLICT IN THIS AREA WAS UP TO KIM IL SUNG. AS FOR THE ROK, IT PUTS ITS BLUE CHIPS ON DETERRENCE AND, IN TURN, REQUISITE READINESS TO MEET ALL CONTINGENCIES. ELABORATING, HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 04472 201118Z

A. IN RECENT VISIT TO I CORPS GROUP, HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY STILWELL/ HOLLINGSWORTH AND CAME AWAY FEELING COMFORTABLE ABOUT THE DEGREE OF PRE-PAJEDNESS.

B. MORE RECENTLY, HE HAD TOURED FRONT LINES AND FOUND HIS SOLDIERS WELL TRAINED, SPRITED AND READY TO DEFEND THEIR POSITIONS TO THE LAST.

C. WHILE ONE CANNOT MAKE MILITARY PLANS PUBLIC, THERE IS AN OLD PROVERB WHICH SAYS, IN ESSENCE, THAT IF THE LEADER IS CONFIDENT, THAT CONFIDENCE IS TRANSMITTED BY HIS MIND TO OTHERS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE KOREAN PEOPLE FEEL SECURE.

D. ROKG, ROK MILITARY, AND ROK CITIZENS REALIZE THAT IT IS THEIR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO MEET ANY ATTACK AND ARE DETERMINED TO DO SO.

3. FURTHER ELABORATING ON D. ABOVE, PRESIDENT STATED HE WAS AWARE OF US CONGRESSIONAL APPREHENSION ABOUT THE CURRENT DISPOSITION OF THE US 2ND DIVISION. HE ALSO KNEW THAT IT WAS GENERAL STILWELL'S DESIRE TO KEEP THAT DIVISION IN STRATEGIC RESERVE IN EVENT OF CONFLICT. WHILE THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT PUBLICLY ENDORSE THIS ROLE FOR 2ND DIVISION, HE COULD ASSURE GENERAL WEYAND THAT ROK GROUND FORCES WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO THE TASK IF FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED STATES IN OTHER DIMENSIONS SUCH AS AIR POWER, ARTILLERY, AND TACTICAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT. GIVEN THIS SORT OF SUPPORT, ROK ARMED FORCES COULD DEFEAT THE ENEMY.

4. GENERAL WEYAND SAID HE APPRECIATED THOSE COMMENTS, ALTHOUGH FROM PRACTICAL STANDPOINT IT WAS NOT LIKELY HIS FORCES COULD REMAIN UNINVOLVED FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. IN HIS VIEW, OBJECTIVE HAS TO KEEP US FORCES DEPLOYED IN KOREA; AND CONTINUE TO IMPRESS ON KIM IL SUNG THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD REACT TO ANY AGRGRESSION AGAINST THE ROK. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RECENTLY DIS-
SECRET

PAGE 03 SEOUL 04472 201118Z

CUSSED THE EVENTS OF 1950 WITH GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR BRADLEY, WHO RECLLAED THAT, DURING THE TRIP TO GENERAL MACARTHUR'S HQS FOR A FEW WEEKS BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR, HE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS WOULD NOT ATTACK. DISCUSSION POINTED UP TWO LESSONS. FIRST WAS THE DIFFICULTY OF GAUGING INTENTIONS AND CORRESPONDING IMPORTANCE OF READINESS AND EARLY WARNING. SECOND WAS ESSENTIALITY OF US PRSENCE FOR DETERRENCE.

5. GENERAL WEYAND SAID THAT THIS IS NO LONGER 1950'S. FOR ONE THING, GREAT SCHISMS HAVE DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE USSR AND CHINA, AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD NORTH KOREAN MILITARY ADVENTURISM HAVE PROBABLY

CHANGED. HE WONDERED IF THE PRESIDENT COULD PROVIDE HIS ASSESSMENT OF THESE RELATIONSHIPS AND THE RESULTANT IMPACT ONEHE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

6. PRESIDENT SAID THERE ARE, OF COURSE, SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES FROM THE SITUATION IN 1950. USSR HAS NOW ACHIEVED NUCLEAR PARITY. IN HIS VIEW, NEITHER PRC NOR USSR WILL ENCOURAGE KIM IL SUNG INTO CONFRONTATION WITH US/ROK. HOWEVER, BIGGER QUESTION IS WHAT WOULD THSE SUPER POWERS DO IF KIM IL SUNG, ON HIS OWN, PROVIKES CONFLICT. PRESIDENT DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNIST POWERS WOULD BE WILLING TO SEE NORTH KOREA SUFFER RESOUNDING DEFEAT.

7. THE PRESIDENT SAID IT IS ALWAYS VERY DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE INTENTIONS OF YOUR ADVERSARY. THEREFORE, PRUDENCE DICTATES THAT ONE BE PREPARED FOR ANY CONTINGENCY. HE POINTED TO A MOTTO ON THE WALL - A CALLIGRAPHY DONE IN HIS OWN HAND - WHICH HE SAID MEANT "WHEN YOU ARE FULLY PREPARED, THERE IS NOTHING TO FEAR."

8. PRESIDENT SAID THERE IS ALWAYS POSSIBILITY OF NORTHERN MISCALCULATION BASED ON:

(A) LACK OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS IN THE ROK,
SECRET

PAGE 04 SEOUL 04472 201118Z

(2) SOCIAL DISORDER IN THE ROK, OR
(3) US RELUCTANCE TO BE AGAIN INVOLVED IN
CONFLICT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

CURRENTLY NORTH KOREA IS PRESSING AN ACTIVE DIPLOMATIC/PROPAGANDA PEACE OFFENSIVE TO WEAKEN SOUTH KOREA INTERNALLY AND DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US AND ROK. OUR COUNTERS TO THAT OFFENSIVE ARE TO BE:

(1) STRONG INTERNALLY;
(2) MAINTAIN VIGILANCE;
(3) INSURE THAT OUR PEOPLE ARE FIRMLY DETERMINED TO RESIST ANY AGGRESSION; AND
(4) CONTINUE TO ANNOUNCE US DECLARATIONS OF SUPPORT.

GIVEN THESE CONDITIONS, PRESIDENT DID NOT EXPECT THAT KIM IL SUNG WOULD MAKE MAJOR ATTACK. HOWEVER, HE DID FEEL DPRK WOULD TRY TO CREATE DISARRAY IN ROK AND WORK ON BOTH US PUBLIC OPINION AND THE US CONGRESS. IN THIS CONNECTION HE POINTED OUT THAT NORTH KOREA WAS WAGING AND ACTIVE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE. MOREOVER, ELEMENTS OF THE CHOSUN SOREN WERE CONCENTRATING ON CONSERVATIVE JAPANESE

POLITICIANS, STRESSING THAT NORTH KOREA WISHED
TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION, WHEREAS REPUBLIC
OF KOREA WAS BLOCKING THAT EFFORT BY EXAGGERATED
STATEMENTS OF NORTH KOREA'S HOSTIL INTENT.
PRESIDENT PARK PREDICTED THAT SAME LINE WOULD EMERGE
IN VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY TARGETED BY
NORTH KOREA.

9. COMMENT: MOST INTERESTING POINT IS THE LAST.
IT SHOWS REALISTIC AWARENESS OF POSSIBILITY THAT
KIM IL SUNG'S SMILE CAMPAIGN MAY BE MAKING GAINS
INTERNATIONALLY AT ROK EXPENSE.
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